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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DONALD F. SLAUGHTER,

Plaintiff a;nd Respondent,

-VS.-

:\[ARIAN T. SLAUGHTER,

Case
No. 10602

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF AP·PELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for divorce filed by the husband.
Appellant sought to avoid a divorce on the ground that
the court was without jurisdiction by reason of the lack
of statutory residence of the respondent. In the alternative, if the court determined it had jurisdiction, appellant sought a divorce in her favor.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court determined it had jurisdiction and
granted a divorce in favor of appellant, awarded to her
custody of the minor son of the parties, made a division
of property, and granted to appellant alimony and support money.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT Or\ ~\PPEAL
Appellant seeks the aid of this eonrt to obtain ,1
property settlem0nt, alimony and support money mori·
f:worable to her than that allowed h~· th(• low0r C'onrt.
STATE~LB~XT

OF FACTS

The parties were manie(l in Salt Lake City, Utah in
1042 (R. 80). At the time of th0 trial the r0spedin• n;;h
of appellant and respondellt were 48 and 30 ~·ears (R. 8\t,
35). Three ehildren were born of the marriage as fol.
lows: Mary, a married daughter; .Janeen, age J fl, ,rli11
v»as a student at the Uni,·ersity of Virginia; and Donald.
horn in 1053. Respondent was a member of the arm:,]
forces of the United States at the time of the m:1~Tia<;1
(R. 3fi) and continued as sueh until he retired as a C'ololll·l
in August, 1965 (R. 94, 3G). During the marriage, respondent \\'aS stationed in 1rnm0rous places in the r11ited States, also in German~· and Thailand. Appella11t and
family were with respondent while he was in Europe arnl
most of the places in the United States (R. 98). )farital
trouble which :finally led to separation of the parties Ol'rurred at about the time respondent went to Thailand in 1
1962. Appellant complains that respondent had n plan
to leave his familv. Another woman was im·oh·pd (R.
79, 80). In any ennt, respondent did leaw the fnmih· ,
home and refused to return (R. 79). At the time nt
the trial appellant was living in the home of the partie•
in Arlington, Virginia, and respondent \ms li\·ing ir
Bellevue, "'\Vashington, and was employed by the Hi1d1·
land College in the State of ·washington. Donald, tlw '
minor son, was li,·ing with his mother in Virginia.
2

POIN'l' NO. 1
TII1'~ LOWER COURT ,\BPSED ITS DISCRETION TX THE DIVISIOX OF PROPERTY
,\X}) IX TIU~ F1XIXG OF THE ..urorxT OF
.\ LL\IOXY XWARDED \\~HIC'H REQPIRES
( 'OTilH~<'TTOX BY THIS COFRT.

:11H1

Tlte followiug is a list of thl' pro1wrty of the parties
t Ii(• \·alrn• placl'd therl'on:

lI11nw iu Virginia (Valur $26,000.00 ll'ss
mortg-age of $14,000.00 )------------··------·-···········-$12,000.00
TT nm<' in Salt Lake City, Utah .................... _________ 19,000.00

flni<'k automobile -----·--··-------------·-···--------··--·--·--··---· 800.00

\'olkswagon automobile --·-----------------------·--·-----·---- 1,000.00
:-.\;n-i1w..; Account in the joint names of thl'

parties:

Deserl't Federal Savings & Loan
"\ssociation, Salt Lake City, Utah____________
A.rlington Fairfax Sa,·ings & Loan
Association, Arlington, Virginia ---·-------Cumberland Valley Savings & Loan
Association, Carlisle, Pa. ------··-------·-··------Sn,·ings Acronnt in Arlington Fairfax Saviugs & Loan Association, Arlington, Virginia, in joint names of parties and
.Tanl'en Slaughter (daughter) ---------------------Sa,·ings Account in Arlington Fairfax Sa,·ings & Loan Association, Arlington, Virginia, in joint names of parties and
Donald Slaughter (son) -----------------------------·-~:1 - $100.00 Fnitl'c1 States Savings Bonds
in t 110 joint names of the parties ... ----------------3

i,407.00
9,852.00
3,238.00

2,040.00

182.00
2,600.00

Corporate stock in joint names of parties
(which was sold by respondent after divorce action commenced) Exhibit No 1
'
. '
Sale price ---------------------------------------------------------- 15,556.00
Inheritance from respondent's mother ______________ 15,000.00
Total --------------------------------------------------$88,675.00
No value was placed on the household furniture
of the parties, some of which was in possession of earh
of the parties at the time of the trial.
In addition to the furniture in her possession, thr.·
lower court awarded to appellant the follov.'ing-:

H

.
ome m

v·irgmia
..

----------------------------------------------------$12,000.00

Buick automobile --------------------------------·-------------------

800.00

Three Savings Accounts in the names of the
parties ---------------------------------------------------------------- 20,497.00
Total __________________________________________________ $33,297.00
The lower court awarded to respondent furniture
in his possession and the following:
Corporate stock sold by respondent, sale price .. $15,556.00
Volkswagen automobile ------------------------------------------

1,000.00

Savings Bonds ----------------------------------------------------------

2,600.00

Two Savings Accounts with the children____________

2,222.00

1

Home in Salt Lake City, Utah ______________________________ 19,000.00
Total ----------------------------------------------$40,378.00
Factors which should be considered in determining the property rights of the parties are enumerated in
Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P. 2d 265, and MacD011-
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1

alrl Y. JfacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P. 2cl 1066. Applied
to the parties in this action some of said factors are:
At tltc time of the marriage -

He was 26 and she was 24 years of age (R. 25, 80).
He was in the armed forces; she was a school
teacher (R. 35, 98).

He had an automobile; she had seven or eight
hundred dollars in savings and a trousseau
(R. 94).
The health of both was good.
Both \Yere college graduates (R. 35, 93).
At the time of the divorce -

The duration of the marriage was 24 years (R. 80).
His health was good - her health was poor.
II e had an income in excess of $1,400.00 per month
($736.30 take-home pay from Highland College
and $642.17 army retirement pay (R. 94, 95). She
had no income and was entirely dependent upon
him (R. 93, 94).

He was 50 years old and had a life expectancy of
approximately 23 years. She was 48 years old and
had a life expectancy of approximately 29 years.
Children of the marriage consisted of one daughter who was married, one daughter who was 19
years of age and attending college, and a boy,
age 12, living with his mother (R. 81).
,\n inheritance of $15,000.00 was acquired by respondent from his mother before the divorce action was filed (R. 95). Respondent had conrtibuted
approximately $2,500.00 to his mother over a period of some senn years before her death in 1964
(R. 89).

5

This oourt said in Wilso11 v. "Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 279
'
296 P. 2d, 977, 979:
Tlie court' s respons1·1n·1r·t y is
. to endeaYor
to provide a just and equitable adjustment of their
economic resources so that the parties can rec 011 _
struct their lives on a happy and useful basis.
In doing so it is necessary for the court to consider, in addition to the relative guilt or innocence of the parties, an appraisal of all of the attendant facts aud circumstances: The duration
of the marriage ; the age of the parties ; their
social positions and standards of living; their
health; considerations relative to children: the
money and property they possess and how it wa;::
acquired; their capabilities and training and their
present and potential incomes.''
" * * *

The lower court failed to provide a ''just and equitable adjustment" of the resources of the parties. Such
failure occurred both with respect to the division of
property as well as in fixing the amount of alimony.
Excluding furniture, the value of the property
awarded is $33,297.00 to appellant and $40,378.00 to respondent. Respondent received an inheritance from his
mother having the value of $15,000.00 (R. 95). The
lower court failed to include the inheritance as part of
the resources of the parties subject to division. Such
was tantamount to awarding the inheritance to respondent. The value of the property awarded to respondent, including the inheritance is $55,378.00 which is 63%
of the total assets and exceeds the value of the portion of
the property awarded to appellant by the sum of
$22,000.00.

6

)._ t1mittcdly most of the assets of the parties were
acquired through the earnings of respondent. However,
appellant was qualified as a school teacher and taught
school for a portion of the time during the marriage
(R. 93). ::\Iost of the Savings Accounts had been accumulated from allotment checks which went to appellant
and \H•rc s~ffed by her (R. 88). Thus the earnings of
appellant and her frugality are highly significant factors
which contributed materially to the resources of the
parties.
The court, in Habbeshaw v. Habbeshaw, 17 Utah 2d.
293, 409 P. 2d 972, in effect approved an award to the
\Yife of substantially one-half of the property of a value
of $175,000.00. In addition she received a Cadillac automohile, $550.00 per month alimony, and protection of
$1;'50,000.00 of life insurance. The marriage was only
four years longer than that in the case at bar and all
of the four children were adults, three of whom were
married. We submit that equity and justice require an
equal diYision of the property between the parties in the
case at bar. Yet, excluding the inheritance, the trial
court would have appellant take $7,000.00 less than
respondent and, with the inheritance included, the appellant comes out with $22,000.00 less than respondent. Inheritance is a factor which should have been considered
hy the lower court in determining the property rights
of the parties. (MacDonald v. MacDonald, supra.) Exclusion of the inheritance from the resources of the parties
in the division made by the lower court was an abuse of
discretion. Such abuse is all the more glaring in the
case at bar by the fact that the resources of the parties

7

~were diminished in the approximate sum of $2,500.00 hY
contributions made by respondent to his mother.
.

The lower court awarded alimony and support monev
to appellant in amounts of $300.00 and $100.00 per montl;
'
respectively. The undisputed evidence is that the minimum needs of appellant total $492.00 per month (R. 92);
that she is presently unable to pursue her career as a
school teacher (R. 94) ; that she is entirely dependent
upon respondent for support and maintenance (R. 94):
and that prior to separation, respondent made an allotment to her in the sum of $800.00 per month (R. 100).
The evidence also sho-\''s that respondent has an income
in excess of $1,400.00 per month, consisting of $736.30
take-home pay from Highland College in the State of
Washington and $642.17 per month army retirement income. It is reasonable to expect respondent's income
will continue in the same or increased amounts for approximately 15 years until normal business retirement at
age 65. He will have the army retirement income for life.
It is also reasonable to assume appellant will have no
income. The lower court would have appellant and minor
son get by on $400.00 per month while respondent, after
paying the alimony and support money, would still han
$1,000.00 per month for himself. This is an abuse of
discretion.
There is no problem in this case of trying to cut "one
blanket to cover two beds" as stated by the court in MacDonald v. MacDonald, supra. Fortunately, respondent's
income is sufficient to permit appellant to be sustained in
a manner somewhat comparable to that which she has

8

heen accustomed without injury to respondent. The
s~andard of living to which appellant has been accustomed
is rrflected somewhat by the allotment of $800.00 per
month made for her by respondent prior to separation.
F'or the trial court to limit appellant to alimony in the
sum of $300.00 per month is an abuse of discretion. The
trial court would deny appellant the privilege of living
h:' her accustomed standard although the income is sufficient to permit this to be done without prejudice to
re«ponclent. The trial court would permit respondent to
retain for his living expenses more than three times the
amount allowed to appellant therefor. The inequity of
the decree of the trial court is further magnified by the
fact that respondent gets a tax deduction for alimony
paid while the already meager award to appellant is redncNl by the tax she is required to pay.

I
1

All that has been urged heretofore has been without
('Onsideration as to the guilt or innocence of the parties.
This court indicated in Wilson Y. Wilson, supra, that
mmitive measures have no place in a divorce decree.
However, the court observed in the Wilson case "that
the court may, and as a practical matter invariably does,
l'o11sider the relative loyalty or disloyalty of the parties
to their marriage vows, and their relative guilt or innocence in causing the breakup of the marriage * * *.'' The
reconl is brief hut clear and undisputed that respondent
is responsible for the "break up of the marriage." He
left appellant; refused to live with her; refused to return;
worked out a plan to leave his family; disturbed another
family and became involved with another woman (R. 79,
80). Regardless of the foregoing, appellant was willing
9

to take him back (R. 70) and made clear to the court lH·r
true feelings ·were that she did not desire a divorce (R.
116). In the Wilson case the husband had fallen in loH
with another woman. The trial c'.:lurt awarc10d the 1\·ifo
almost all of the propert~- and alimony in 1110 sum of
$5,000.00. The husband complained that the trial comt
had penalized him for falling in Ion~ with another
woman. This court upheld the award to the wife of almoRt
all the property but modified the decree with respeet to
alimony from $5,000.00 to $2,400.00 By way of contrast, in the case at bar it would app0ar that th<" trfol
court would penalize the innocent party who is willilll!'
to forgive and forget and who had attempted to prese1Te
the marriage and that it would reward the philanc1Pn'1·
who has "walked away" from the marriaµ;c and 1rn11t
"out."
The function of the appellate court in a diY01w
action has been stated in two recent cases as follows:
M artinett v. M artinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P. 2d 821:
"We are in accord with the postulate advocated
by the defendant that divorce proceedings lwinQ'
in equity, this court will review the eviaence nnd
may substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court if circumstances warrant doing so. XeYertheless, it is firmly established in our law that the
trial judge will be indulg·ed considerable latitude
of discretion in adjusting the financial and propertv interests of the parties; conversely, howeYer,
if there is such serious inequity as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion, this court will make thi>
modification necessary to bring abont a just result. * * *"
10

i

i
I

(}raziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321 P. 2d 931:

"* • * Termination of the marriage being inevitable, the object to be desired was to fashion a
<lecree which would be just and equitable under
the circumstances and, insofar as possible, minimize the animosity which had developed; and to
provide the best possible basis for the parties to
reconstruct their lives in a happy and useful manner, with primary concern for the welfare of their
rhilcl. \Ve remain mindful of the propriety of in<lulging deference to the judgment of the trial
court in that regard and of not lightly disturbing
it. Yet under the broad powers of review in
eCJuity with which this court is endowed, when a
(li\·orce decree is under attack, it has always been
regarded as an attack upon the whole decree, and
when it appears that there is an abuse of discretion so that an inequity or injustice is wrought,
the court has proceeded to make such adjustments
as it deemed necessary to do justice between the
parties and to give effect to the purpose just
mentioned above.''
We respectfully submit that equity and justice require a modification of the decree to award to appellant
at least one-half of the property and alimony commensurate with her minimum needs according to her undisputed testimony.

11

CONCLUSION
Appellant sought to resist the divorce on jurdisdictional grounds. The trial court summarily resolved tlitjurisdictional question (R. 77) and indicated that he> wa,
obligated by reason of the law in this state to grant a
diYorce (R. 116). The true feeling of appellant is rlear
that she does not desire a divorce (R. 116). If the law
is such that a diYorce must be forced upon her against
her will at least she should not be penalized by being
deprived of her rightful share of the accumulated property and of sufficient funds to permit a eomfortahle li\·ing.
Proper application to the case at bar of the factors used
to determine the property rights of the parties leads tn
but one conclusion that "serious inequity" and "aliu~1·
of discretion" in the decree of the trial court requirP
modification and adjustment by this court in order to
accomplish justice and equity in behalf of appellant.
Respedfully submitted,
HAROLD R. BOYER
Of ROl\INEY & BOYER
1409 vValker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defenda11tAppellant

